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Introduction
In current political practice in many countries, 
cost-benefi t analysis (CBA) is applied in 
evaluating public projects and regulatory 
instruments. In evaluation using CBA, the 
effort is to express the comprehensive effect 
of a project or a governmental regulation on 
social welfare. Social welfare can be affected 
by changing environmental quality, improving 
quality of life due to better healthcare, etc. Since 
many projects essentially affect environmental 
quality either positively or adversely, the effect 
of non-monetary costs and benefi ts derived 
from changing environmental quality is often 
involved in CBA in addition to fi nancial costs 
and benefi ts. CBA is therefore an evaluation 
method widely discussed in neoclassical 
environmental economics, e.g. [13], [12].
What has enabled CBA to become one of the 
most widespread methods in political decision-
making? Dryzek [6] offers an explanation in his 
environmental discoursive analysis. According 
to him, methods such as CBA, risk analysis 
and EIA (environmental impact assessment) 
have penetrated political practice due to the 
overwhelming conviction that decision-making 
on political issues should be left to experts. That 
is why he believes expert agencies such as the 
US EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) and 
the United Nations Environment Programme 
have come into existence. CBA introduces this 
expertise to political decision-making. From 
the point of view of neoclassical economics, 
CBA is capable of answering the question 
whether a policy project or regulatory tool is 
benefi cial or detrimental to society. According 
to neoclassical environmental economics, 
therefore, politicians should subject their crucial 
decisions infl uencing environmental quality to 
CBA. CBA advocates also see its application as 
a way to improve the effi ciency of control over 
the meaningfulness of political action, increase 
the transparency of regulation and diminish the 
infl uence of lobby groups, as discussed e.g. 
in [4]. Politicians’ decisions are not random: 
political action is supported by CBA results [1].
In the USA since Reagan’s era the 
requirement to decide based on CBA in 
regulatory impact analyses (RIA) was anchored 
in the legislation by Executive Order 12291 in 
1981. All the governmental agencies, including 
EPA, employ CBA in their decision-making 
[1]. The basic requirement for a monetary 
expression of monetarily quantifi able effects, 
therefore the application of CBA in RIA, 
remains preserved till now in the USA (partial 
amendments by Clinton’s Executive Order 
12866 in 1993 and Obama’s Executive Order 
13536 in 2011). CBA is also in abundant use 
in the EU political decision-making, although 
RIA analyses across European countries 
vary in their methodologies used for impact 
assessment. The only country long insisting on 
CBA for RIA analyses has been the UK [23]. 
In major European countries including France, 
Germany, Spain or Italy, RIA does not contain 
a robust economic appraisal [5]. CBA has 
been largely used in EU countries as a basis 
for decisions concerning allocation of subsidies 
from Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund.
Although neoclassical economists agree on 
the meaningfulness of using CBA in decision-
making, they subject parts of its methodology 
to scholarly refl ection. CBA as a method 
within neoclassical economics has therefore 
been evolving in some aspects. Its real-world 
applications make use of different procedures 
based on different arguments. Due to the 
disunited methodology employed in practical 
CBA execution, the results of studies may be 
misleading. Two different studies of the same 
thing based on different methodologies may 
arrive at fundamentally different conclusions. 
CBA results may also be deliberately distorted 
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by adjusting the method chosen to the required 
outcome. However, practical CBA may also 
involve other problems such as the degree of 
expertise of its performers (methodological 
problems of CBA for the Dutch case discussed 
in [20]).
This paper outlines the methodological 
disagreements in the performance of CBA. 
It further focuses on issues of practical CBA 
applications from the point of view of impartiality 
of CBA performers. We bring a criticism of 
the current setting of CBA execution. As an 
example, we use CBA performed for the 
purposes of applying for EU funding from 
Structural Funds in the Czech Republic. Our 
theoretical analysis shows that with the current 
setting of rules for the CBA performance for 
the purposes of EU funding, its performers 
cannot be expected to show expertise and 
impartiality. We support the theoretical analysis 
results with data from our own empirical survey 
among commercial CBA performers who offer 
consulting in the area of EU Structural Funds. 
There is no reason to believe that the Czech 
Republic is a mere exception in this sense and 
that CBA performance works any better in other 
countries.
The fi rst section of the paper outlines 
the theoretical basis of CBA grounded in 
neoclassical economics. The next section 
presents critical arguments voiced from the 
neoclassical economic school. This discussion 
is followed by a section dealing with the issues 
of practical CBA application on the example of 
the Czech Republic. The fi nal section of the 
paper presents suggestions for resolving the 
current unsatisfactory situation.
1. Theoretical Grounding of CBA
CBA is based in neoclassical economics, 
currently the mainstream of economic theory. 
Since CBA is widely applied in environmental 
protection, we shall make the introduction to its 
theoretical grounding using environmental CBA 
as an example. The introduction to neoclassical 
environmental economics may be found e.g. 
in [26]. CBA rests upon an anthropocentric 
valuation of the environment, that is, the humans’ 
subjective valuation based on their individual 
preferences. Neoclassical economics is based 
on consumer sovereignty, sees consumer 
preferences as exogenous and respects any 
subjective consumer opinion. The question an 
economist solves is the optimum allocation of 
resources based on these preferences [12]. 
In CBA, these preferences are then refl ected 
in the monetary valuation of environmental 
goods and services as well as other non-
traded goods. The value of environmental 
goods and services expresses an individual’s 
willingness to pay for an improvement or 
a change to the quantity of the environmental 
goods and services, or willingness to accept 
monetary compensation for deterioration of 
the environmental goods and services. The 
total social value of a certain natural resource 
is then the sum of the subjective individual 
values attributed to it by the individuals within 
the society [16]. Environmental economics has 
developed a number of special methods in 
order to seek for environmental value (for more 
on environmental valuation methods, see, e.g. 
[9], [13], [30], [19]).
The purpose of CBA is to decide on the 
worthiness of a public investment or regulation 
(e.g. investment in a wastewater treatment 
plant) based on quantitatively expressed 
benefi ts and costs. Thus it seeks to bring 
the nature of the public sector decision-
making closer to the situation common in the 
private sector. A company will also weigh the 
costs and benefi ts of its business plans. The 
recoverability of public funds is viewed in CBA 
in connection with balancing social benefi ts 
and costs. If a public investment brings no 
fi nancial gains yet we maintain that it is socially 
benefi cial, it has to bring other benefi ts than 
fi nancial, such as environmental improvement 
and, through it, welfare increase of its users. 
When assessing the suitability of public 
plans from this point of view, a plan whose 
total benefi ts discounted to the present value 
outweigh its total discounted costs is justifi able. 
In the case of the wastewater treatment plant, 
CBA will balance the social benefi ts, which may 
be benefi ts derived from reduced watercourse 
pollution, against the social costs, which may 
be the capital investment and operating costs 
of the treatment plant and the adverse impact 
of the treatment plant on the local environment 
(odour near the plant, affecting the quality 
of housing, for example). The mainstream 
CBA methodology (not every CBA advocate 
identifi es with the mainstream CBA method, 
as we will see below) is based on the Kaldor-
Hicks compensation criterion. This criterion 
tests the possibility of those who have benefi ted 
from the project compensating for those who 
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have suffered a loss from it. According to this 
criterion, the public sector plan in question is 
welfare increasing if, after its execution, goods 
can theoretically be redistributed so that the 
situation after the redistribution of these goods 
is a Pareto improvement to the no-project 
situation [1].
It follows from the above that the result 
of CBA describes the effective demand for 
a public plan [13]. Not only does it show every 
person’s voting on the matter but it can also 
discover the degree of their preference. The 
different voices for and against do not weigh 
the same in CBA. They are weighted according 
to the degree of preference, expressed here as 
the degree of willingness to pay or willingness 
to accept compensation.
2. Methodological Disunities of CBA
Although the CBA method is highly elaborated 
and widely recognised, there is no agreement 
in opinion among economists concerning its 
methodology. We shall focus on a discussion of 
the normative issues of equity, (re)distribution 
of wealth in society and mutual equality of 
people (discussion of other issues e.g. in [29], 
[7]). Gramlich [10] deals with the distribution 
issues connected with CBA in detail. He points 
out that two different projects – one bringing net 
benefi t to the poor, the other bringing the same 
net benefi t per dollar invested to the rich – are 
equal from the CBA point of view. According 
to the CBA result, it does not matter which of 
the projects is chosen. Still, the society may 
prefer a more desirable redistribution of wealth, 
normatively towards the poor. Mainstream CBA 
is nothing more and nothing less than a Kaldor-
Hicks compensation test. Since no actual 
compensations are made in reality (actual 
compensations are not technical feasible due 
to enormous transaction costs), the project may 
result in a shift of wealth from the poor towards 
the rich, thus exacerbating inequalities in 
society. Even a project that brings an additional 
effect to the wealthiest social class to which 
the entire society contributes may increase the 
social welfare according to CBA. CBA does not 
examine who suffers a loss from a project (the 
poor or the rich) and who earns from it.
Moreover, as stated by Hanley and Spash 
[13], the relatively richer have a relatively 
stronger vote in CBA than the relatively poorer. 
Their willingness to pay or accept compensation 
will be higher in absolute terms than those of 
the poor. The votes would weigh equally only 
under the condition of the equal distribution 
of wealth in society [13]. The CBA outcome is 
therefore dependent on the wealth distribution 
in society and will more likely unfold from the 
desires of the relatively richer social classes.
According to Adler and Posner [1], however, 
it is correct that CBA does not consider the 
distribution of wealth. They believe that 
economists dealing with economic effi ciency 
and changes in total welfare have nothing to say 
on the wealth distribution in society. According 
to them, the wealth distribution in society is 
a purely political issue. If a government wishes 
to redistribute wealth, Adler and Posner [1, 
p. 186] consider that a more cost-effective way 
is “through taxes and transfers rather than by 
building dams in poor areas or toxic waste 
dumps in rich areas”. Among others, also Frank 
[8] mentions tax progression as a solution to the 
problems of the poor. On the other hand, some 
economists see an opportunity to include equity 
issues directly in CBA by means of explicit 
distribution weights of votes. However, that 
would imply weighting individuals’ willingness 
to pay based on the individuals’ marginal utility 
of money. The discussion of distribution weight 
of votes is summed up in [1].
Sen [25] in his refl ection of CBA focuses 
on methods for valuating public goods; 
defi ning them in accordance with Samuelson’s 
approach as non-rival goods that cannot be 
excluded from consumption (for the summary of 
other Sen’s comments to CBA, see [15]) . They 
are evaluated in the same way as if they were 
private goods: individuals’ willingness to pay for 
the provision of these goods is sought just as if 
the individuals were capable of paying for the 
goods individually, without the help of others. 
Sen [25] quotes the Exxon Valdez disaster as 
an example. In ordinary contingent valuation, 
the researcher asks how much you would be 
willing to pay to restore the environment to the 
state prior to the disaster. Say your reply as 
a respondent’s is 20 dollars. However, that is 
an irrelevant scenario according to Sen. One 
cannot pay 20 dollars and believe that the 
disaster consequences will be removed thanks 
to one’s payment. The personal sacrifi ce of 
the payment to which contingent valuation is 
bound changes very little in providing the good; 
the payment itself changes virtually nothing in 
a disaster of the Exxon Valdez dimensions. 
Sen compares an individual’s decision-making 
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concerning the purchase of a private good to 
that concerning the individual’s contribution to 
environmental protection. Whereas you are 
unaffected by other people’s willingness to pay 
when buying a private good, such as a tube of 
toothpaste, you tend to be strongly infl uenced 
by whether and how much others are willing to 
pay when deciding about your contribution to 
environmental protection. Sen [25] highlights 
the need for a common effort to provide 
a public good. Instead of the usual valuation 
based on a market analogy, Sen believes the 
method should employ the social choice model, 
formulated by Arrow [3]. His idea is to confront 
respondents with realistic alternative solutions, 
including the explicit statement of possible 
responses by other members of society.
CBA advocates have been intensely 
discussing the discounting method and discount 
rate used in CBA, e.g in [2]. Exponential 
discounting, working with a constant discount 
rate, is the norm. As summarized in [8], 
exponential discounting does not match 
people’s decision-making patterns. Hyperbolic 
discounting, in other words a gradual reduction 
in the discount rate over time, would be a closer 
representation. Faced by the decision to accept 
100 dollars today or 105 dollars in a week 
versus 100 dollars in a year or 105 dollars in 
a year and a week, most people will choose 100 
dollars today in the former case and 105 dollars 
in a year and a week in the latter. In the latter 
case, deciding about an event that will occur 
a year from now, the perceived time value of 
money does not decrease as fast over a week 
as in the former case. One prefers to wait for an 
extra week to get a larger amount of money. This 
should correspond to a decreasing discount 
rate over time. Assuming a constant discount 
factor, the decisions should be identical: either 
the person should choose 100 dollars in both 
cases or 105 dollars in both cases, depending 
on the individual’s discount rate [8]. The height 
of the discount rate is another aspect thoroughly 
discussed among economists. It may vary 
considerably from a rate close to zero to 
20%. Also for these extreme discount rates 
a justifi cation may be found as summarized in 
[22]. Some economists prefer to use a discount 
rate based on the opportunity cost of capital 
(higher rates of exponential discounting), some 
prefer to derive the discount rate from the pure 
rate of social time preference which discounts 
welfare of future generations (lower rates of 
exponential as well as hyperbolic discounting). 
A valuable overview of the discussion of 
different concepts of social discount rent may 
be found in [14].
There is a fairly wide range of opinions 
on the correct CBA procedure among its 
advocates. Some insist on the application of the 
classic mainstream CBA based on the Kaldor-
Hicks compensation criterion, exponential 
discounting, etc. Others tend towards the 
accurate application of a less commonly used 
CBA method, such as the use of hyperbolic 
discounting and distribution weights of votes. 
Yet others refuse mechanistic adoption of the 
CBA methodology from textbooks and call for 
a certain fl exibility. As stated by Adler and Posner 
[1], who defend the need for fl exibility in drafting 
CBA techniques for specifi c applications, 
practical executions of CBA have to provide 
room for deontological ethics, for instance. This 
means that CBA recommendations may in no 
case violate some ethical rules: theft must not 
be recommended even if its social benefi ts 
outweigh its costs. They also say that CBA 
analyses should always respect the specifi c 
distribution of wealth in a society.
The pliability of the CBA method is related 
to one of the fundamental questions of its 
application. The possibility of choosing the 
CBA method results in a situation in which one 
CBA performer proves the net social benefi t 
of a measure while another disproves it. 
A famous recent example is the debate of the 
appropriateness of investing in prevention of 
global climate change. According to Stern [27], 
investing in preventive measures in climate 
change pays off very well to society. Nordhaus 
[21] refutes Stern’s result. In his view, Stern’s 
analysis only arrives at that conclusion due to 
its use of a very low discount rate which was in 
Stern’s analysis derived from a very low pure 
rate of social time preference and a specifi c 
utility function.
3. Questions Concerning Practical 
Application of CBA in a Czech 
Republic Example
Currently, the Czech Republic sees a wide 
application of CBA although there is no legal 
obligation for governmental agencies to employ 
CBA in their decision-making. There has 
admittedly been an obligation for the supreme 
state administration bodies to apply RIA when 
deciding about the establishment and form of 
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any generally binding legal regulation in the 
Czech Republic since 2007. The Czech legal 
system does not impose any obligation to use 
a specifi c qualitative or quantitative analysis, 
such as CBA, as part of RIA. The choice is 
therefore up to the RIA performer (Government 
Resolution no 922/2011 Coll.). A large number 
of CBA are currently made chiefl y for the 
purposes of obtaining subsidies from EU Funds. 
Applicants have frequently been required to 
elaborate CBA under the EU Structural Fund 
programming period 2007–2013 (see subsidy 
conditions of operational programmes and 
regional operational programmes of the Czech 
Republic). For an applicant to obtain a subsidy 
from the EU Funds, the CBA has to prove 
positive net social benefi ts of his project. In 
many programmes (e.g. Regional Operational 
Programmes and Operational Programmes 
Transport), the requirement to provide CBA 
has been derived from the project cost amount. 
A CBA has to be performed if project costs 
exceed a certain amount, typically tens or 
hundreds of millions of CZK (roughly units or 
tens of millions of EURO), depending on the 
conditions of each operational programme.
We demonstrate the chain of players in the 
Czech model of CBA performance for obtaining 
subsidies from EU Funds by the following 
scheme:
CBA performer → subsidy applicant →
→ offi cials processing subsidies → the public
Subsidy applicants are responsible for 
providing CBA for their projects on their own 
They typically commission the CBA with 
commercial contractors offering such services. 
Subsidy applicants pay for the elaboration of 
CBA with their own funds. The CBA performer is 
therefore in a contractor-customer relationship 
with the applicant. The CBA client is a customer 
whose interest is to prove a positive net social 
benefi t of the project in order to obtain the 
subsidy. It is in the interest of the contractor 
to accommodate the customer. The CBA 
performer can choose many ways how to do so. 
We showed methodological disunities which 
may affect the CBA result above. CBA results 
can be further affected, for example, by the 
method of predicting future benefi ts and costs, 
the choice of “signifi cant” and “unimportant” 
benefi ts and costs, which either enter the CBA 
or not, or the defi nition of stakeholders [13]. 
CBA results are therefore relatively easy to 
manipulate. The opportunity for infl uencing 
CBA results is supported by the fact that few 
people understand its methodology. Reviewing 
the correctness of CBA procedures is thus 
made diffi cult.
In the Czech Republic, the CBA performer 
bears no liability for its potential incorrectness. 
Anyone may offer CBA performance. No 
licence whatsoever is required that could be 
suspended or revoked if defi ciencies are found 
in elaborated CBA, as is the case with the 
driving licence if you fail to comply with set rules. 
This, however, leads to a concern about the 
impartiality and expert level of CBA performed 
for the purposes of applications for EU funding. 
For the offi cials deciding on the subsidy, as well 
as for the public, in whose interest is not to waste 
money on unjustifi ed projects, it is theoretically 
possible to supervise CBA. However, the 
general knowledge of the CBA methodology is 
very weak. This can be inferred from the fact 
that CBA methodology is not included in the 
overwhelming majority of university economic 
curricula. In such a situation, conscious offi cials 
or conscious members of the public cannot 
be expected to perform an effective review. 
Moreover, taking into account the arguments 
of the public choice school, such as offi cials’ 
action to their own benefi t, rational ignorance 
of voters, or the disadvantage of the public as 
a specifi c interest group consisting in its low 
level of organisation, an effective review and 
the discovery of potential errors in real-world 
CBA cannot be expected.
4. The Survey among Czech CBA 
Performers
In order to confi rm our hypothesis of the 
low level of expertise and impartiality in 
performing CBA for purposes of EU subsidy 
applications, we carried out a survey among 
CBA performers. We addressed six randomly 
chosen commercial corporations which offer 
consulting in the area of EU Structural Funds 
including CBA performance on the Czech 
market (according to expert judgement there 
are tens of such corporations there). The survey 
method chosen was a questionnaire with open-
ended questions joined with a face-to-face 
interview. We questioned a representative 
from each of these corporations who takes 
part in performing CBA. The rate of response 
return was 100%. We inquired about (i) the 
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expert background of addressed corporations 
concerning CBA performance, (ii) the methods 
used in CBA by their corporation, and (iii) the 
rate of CBA performed by their corporation 
proving a welfare increase.
The answers to (i) uncovered that 
employees pursuing CBA are not necessarily 
economists and therefore did not usually get in 
contact with CBA until in their job. If they are 
economists, they also often got in contact with 
CBA in their job for the fi rst time. To be able 
to elaborate CBA, CBA performers in these 
companies use EU or national guides to CBA, 
visit additional training courses or learn about 
CBA from their colleagues.
As can be inferred from the answers to 
(ii), none of the addressed companies used 
an exact and reliable scientifi c method of CBA 
performance as known to economic theory 
and as presented in economic textbooks, 
e.g. in [13]. As the responses of corporation 
representatives show, these corporations 
did not discuss the choice of benefi ts and 
costs entering CBA thoroughly. The choice 
of CBA inputs for appraisal was executed by 
the CBA performer without any support for 
his or her choice in academic sources. These 
chosen benefi ts and costs were subsequently 
assessed with the utilisation of following data 
sources: clients of these corporations at the 
fi rst place, less frequently existing statistical 
data (mainly from Czech Statistical Offi ce), and 
own expert judgements. None of the addressed 
respondent collected data on his own and 
used standard methods for benefi ts and costs 
valuation described in economic textbooks, 
e.g. in [9], such as contingent valuation, or 
the hedonic price method. A typical procedure 
of the data formation and data processing in 
CBA performed by corporations in our sample 
may be demonstrated on a case described 
by one of respondents. The case deals with 
the calculation of benefi ts thanks to a school 
building reconstruction. The assumption of 
the performer was as follows: the school 
building reconstruction leads to a better 
learning environment and therefore better 
employment opportunities of graduates due to 
better learning outcomes. Better employment 
opportunities further lead to higher wages of 
graduates. The increase of wages is one of 
the project benefi ts. The CBA performer stated 
that to evaluate this benefi t, he took the data of 
the number of school graduates from his client, 
used statistical data about the average wage 
in the particular fi eld of study, and performed 
an expert judgement about the increase of 
graduates’ wages above the average due to the 
school reconstruction. Annual benefi ts equalled 
the sum of wage increases of graduates in 
a particular year. It is not clear however, if and 
to which degree a better school environment 
leads to higher education outcomes. The CBA 
performer did neither cite any study to prove his 
hypothesis, nor did he realise his own survey 
testing this hypothesis. This benefi t may equal 
to zero and loses its validity. A similar situation 
in the approach to costs and benefi ts’ appraisal 
occurred in other companies of our sample. 
The unavoidable consequence is the loss of 
information power of these CBA results.
The answers to the rate of CBA results 
proving a welfare increase (iii) ranged between 
90% and 100%. It shows a high rate of CBA 
proving a welfare increase by assessed 
projects. A bias in favour of the client can be 
demonstrated on the following statement of 
a respondent. He stated that the costs and 
benefi ts valuation is just manipulation with 
numbers to prove benefi cial effects of projects 
for his customers.
It can be inferred from this survey that at 
least a certain non-negligible segment of the 
commercial CBA performers processes CBA 
in an insuffi cient quality. At the same time, 
our fi ndings lead us to conclude that CBA are 
not performed impartially and are frequently 
purely formal. The validity of our survey results 
may be supported in a broader context by the 
conclusion of the UK National Audit Offi ce 
survey (cited in [23]) which was based on the 
assessment of performed RIA. According to 
this survey, the economic quality of English 
RIA using the cost-benefi t appraisal is poor due 
to the poor quantifi cation of benefi ts as well 
as poor transparency of data sources. In this 
context, the overall situation in the widespread 
use of CBA seems unsatisfactory.
5. Deliberations on a Solution
The current way of applying CBA for the 
purposes of applying for EU funding often 
leads to mendacious, unreliable conclusions. 
In addition, a precisely performed CBA is 
costly and time consuming due to the need 
of expressing all the benefi ts and costs in 
monetary terms based on valuation methods 
discussed in economic textbooks, e.g. [9]. 
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Therefore the application of less demanding 
alternative evaluation instruments from the point 
of view of their methodology, where feasible, 
appears to be the fi rst possible solution to the 
unsatisfactory use of CBA. Among others, an 
alternative instrument is cost-effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) or cost-utility analysis (CUA), 
or other methods, such as discussed in [28]. 
CEA can be applied where a clear political goal 
is declared that can be refl ected by a single 
measure of effectiveness and only the most 
effective path towards this goal is sought [18]. 
CEA enables to choose projects that generate 
the greatest effect per dollar spent. CUA is 
a close relative to CEA. It works with the 
preferences of individuals and seeks to choose 
a project, from which highest satisfaction of 
individuals per dollar spent is gained. This 
satisfaction is called utility. CUA works with 
a single measure or multiple measures of 
effectiveness [18]. Similarly to CEA, the 
outcomes of alternatives are not necessarily 
expressed in monetary terms in CUA.
CEA and CUA are widely used in healthcare 
[24] or education [18]. These areas are 
characterised by a very diffi cult expression 
of non-monetary effects in monetary terms. 
There is no reason why CEA or CUA could not 
be applied more frequently in other areas too, 
such as projects’ selection for EU funding, for 
instance in environmental protection area. Air 
pollution may be taken as an example of an 
area which may profi t from the use of these 
methods. Pollution limits for substances such 
as PM10 (fi ne dust particles in the air) are 
exceeded in many regions and their reduction 
can be part of policy objectives defi ned in 
Operational Programmes for EU funding. 
When a policy objective is set, the most cost-
effective way towards its fulfi lment is sought. 
Measures reducing the emissions of PM10 to 
the air frequently have additional outcomes too, 
such as a reduction in the emissions of sulphur 
dioxide and greenhouse gases. CEA would not 
take these side effects into account. CUA would 
take them into consideration by the assignment 
of specifi c weights to different pollutants. Neither 
CEA nor CUA are problem-free in their practical 
applications however. [17] bring ex-post 
evaluation of twenty four CE studies of cancer 
therapies and fi nd considerable methodological 
fl aws in a signifi cant number of them. Similarly, 
[11] critically appraised fi fty-four CU studies in 
child health with a similar conclusion. 
Alternative methods cannot be applied to 
projects that are original by nature and whose 
necessity is not clearly defi ned by a political 
decision. CBA may appear as the only suitable 
criterion for decisions particularly in such 
cases. However, CBA results have to be trusted 
then. The results will only be trustworthy if 
the author’s professionalism and interest in 
performing CBA impartial can be relied upon. 
CBA performers must not be answerable to EU 
funding applicants to decrease the bias. The 
chain of players for the CBA elaboration for 
obtaining subsidies from EU Funds needs to 
be changed accordingly to enable an unbiased 
review of the project by CBA. Therefore we 
propose the following mechanism:
Subsidy 
applicant  
→
 
offi cials 
processing 
subsidies  
→
 
the public
↑
CBA performer
The reliability of the analyses will also be 
supported by the strict publication of the full CBA 
procedures that will enable an expert discussion 
of the CBA methodology and inputs, thus 
a more effective control. The CBA procedure 
must not be a black box. The possibility of 
a more effective control may at least decrease 
the rate of the deliberate manipulation of the 
CBA results. The trustworthiness of CBA would 
be much helped if their performers were liable 
for clearly unprofessional CBA. This could be 
helped by publishing a kind of a blacklist of 
unprofessional CBA performers or certifi cation 
of expert CBA performers if the certifi cate might 
be suspended or revoked upon the identifi cation 
of clearly unprofessional CBA.
Conclusion
Generally speaking, there is an agreement 
among mainstream economists that in a certain 
form and circumstances, CBA is the best possible 
evaluation tool for public sector decision-making. 
CBA introduces a certain order to decision-
making. The possibility of arguing based on its 
results improves the transparency of decision-
making and allows more effective control over 
politicians’ actions. Nonetheless, CBA faces 
considerable practical problems which may 
impose limitation on its use.
The paper deals with the question of 
trustworthiness of practical execution of CBA on 
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an example of CBA performance. Our concerns 
relate to the interest in bending the CBA results 
for one’s own benefi t. We present results of the 
survey among performers of CBA for purposes 
of EU subsidy applications. We examine the 
situation of the Czech Republic.
The person choosing the CBA performer for 
the purposes of project appraisal for EU funding 
is at the same time the subsidy applicant and 
thus with a clear interest in the optimistic result 
of the CBA. As our survey among commercial 
CBA performers shows, many entities 
performing CBA lack expert background for 
CBA performance and performed CBA are 
often biased and misleading. CBA performers 
are not required to obtain any certifi cates before 
performing CBA, meaning virtually anyone is 
free to offer CBA performance on the market. 
Another reason for inexpert CBA outcomes is 
the fact that the complicated CBA methodology 
prohibits a good awareness of it among the 
public, offi cials and politicians, rendering the 
effective review of CBA outcomes diffi cult. The 
relevance of the CBA results is questionable in 
such an environment.
Some conclusions and recommendations 
can be drawn from the above. Less demanding 
methods, such as CEA or CUA can be 
employed in decision-making instead of CBA, 
if feasible. We may wish to use CBA if other 
analyses cannot be applied in the given case. 
However, CBA results have to be trustworthy. 
The trustworthiness of CBA would be much 
helped if its performer was not answerable with 
the CBA result to the EU subsidy applicant and 
was liable for any unprofessional CBA. CBA 
performance makes sense only if we can rely 
on its results.
The author is grateful to Ondřej Vojáček, 
Ph.D. for his valuable comments. Thanks go 
also to my student Pavla Murgašová for her 
assistance in collecting data from commercial 
CBA performers in the Czech Republic.
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Abstract
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: TOO OFTEN BIASED
Eliška Vejchodská
Cost-benefi t analysis (CBA) is widely applied in many countries in evaluating public projects 
and regulatory instruments. It is employed, for example, as a basis for decisions within the 
European Union’s subsidy policy. CBA enables to express the comprehensive effect of a project 
or a governmental regulation on social welfare and thereby to introduce expertise to political 
decision-making. However, its practical applications face many problems. Different methodological 
choices in performing CBA enable to obtain diametrically opposite conclusions. Moreover, the 
way how investors apply for EU Fund subsidies encourages CBA performers to adjust CBA 
results to requirements of subsidy applicants. The unavoidable consequence is frequently 
mendacious, unreliable and misleading CBA. The paper brings an overview of the fl exibility in CBA 
methodological choices. It further focuses on analysing the CBA performance practice in the area 
of CBA project appraisal for the purposes of applying for EU funding. We examine the reasons for 
manipulating results using a theoretical analysis and support our fi ndings by our own empirical 
survey among CBA performers. As our survey among commercial CBA performers uncovers, many 
entities performing CBA lack expert background for CBA performance and performed CBA are 
often biased and misleading. Our theoretical analysis shows its main reason: The person choosing 
and remunerating the CBA performer for the purposes of a project appraisal for EU funding is at the 
same time the subsidy applicant and thus with a clear interest in the optimistic result of the CBA. 
CBA performers are happy to oblige their customers. The remedy to this situation is to get rid of this 
unintentional alliance among CBA performers and subsidy applicants.
Key Words: Cost-benefi t analysis, CBA, bias, refl ection, Czech Republic.
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